NEW:  Executive Pay for Luck: New Evidence Over the Last 20 Years discusses the concept of “pay for luck,” a theory of executive rent extraction, in view of recent data showing increase in median CEO compensation accompanied by decreases in median stockholder returns, and based on data covering the last 20 years, conclude regulations intended to rebalance performance and pay by encouraging greater oversight of executive compensation were successful, and significant decreases in pay for luck among companies that have adopted intensive Compensation Discussion & Analysis disclosures.

Willis Towers Watson reports that the use of retention requirements precluding corporate executives from selling equity awarded under incentive plans immediately upon vesting has nearly doubled over the past decade in CEO Stock Incentives Increasingly Tied to Stock Ownership and Retention.

Are CEOs Encouraged to Take Too Much Risk? investigates the relationship between CEO compensation is related to health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other workforce-related violations, finding evidence suggesting that CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to the frequency and the severity of workplace violations.