NEW: The Risks and Rewards of Shareholder Voting discusses stockholder voting as suffering from collective action limitations and “notoriously uninformed,” citing this as a risk supporting limits on submission of stockholder proposals, and a flaw in the theoretical basis for standard shifting under Alan Kahn, et al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al., No. 334, 2013, opinion (Del. Mar. 14, 2014), concluding that management should be wary of the use of stockholder voting as a decision-making tool. The Value of Shareholder Voting offers a counterpoint, challenging the assertion that stockholders routinely seek to control companies’ operational decisions by submitting stockholder proposals.
Tulane’s professor Ann Lipton discusses recent research on retail stockholder voting behavior and implications, including desirability of disclosure of the identities of voting stockholders in The Votes of Retail Shareholders.
George Washington University’s Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham proposes increase in voting power of long-term, committed shareholders by give more voting power to shares held in large amounts for long periods in Quality Shareholder Voting.
Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting examines retail stockholder behavior based on voting records, finding distinctions between large stakeholders, who turn out at high rates and strongly oppose shareholder proposals, and more populous small stakeholders, who turn out at lower rates and show higher support for shareholder proposals.